Clinton in North Korea: Stealth Diplomacy
August 14, 2009
By Clayton Dube
The ties between the United States and North Korea have always been complex. The North Koreans have always wanted direct negotiations with the U.S., and the U.S. has preferred to involve others — the South Koreans, the Chinese, the Japanese and the Russians. Years ago, the North Koreans described the South Koreans as American puppets and refused to directly deal with them, insisting that they wanted to talk with the decision-makers. This changed with the 1997 South Korean election of Kim Dae-jung, who initiated the cooperation-focused Sunshine Policy and ultimately met with Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang. A few years before, the Clinton administration had managed to forge better — but still not good — ties with North Korea. Former President Jimmy Carter, then Representative Bill Richardson, and then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright all visited North Korea during the Clinton years.
The two central North Korean issues haven’t changed over the course of the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations. The U.S. wants North Korea to halt its own nuclear weapons program, and to stop supplying nuclear technology and missiles to other countries. Each administration has encouraged China to use its considerable leverage to pressure North Korea into agreeing to disarm in exchange for economic aid, including help in meeting energy needs. Naturally, the Chinese government appreciates being needed, but its interests and America’s don’t always coincide. So it has sometimes pushed hard to get North Korean agreement and sometimes elected not to push at all. It does the Chinese government little good to be seen as executing a plan drafted in Washington.
However, in general it is in the interest of both China and America to a) reduce the danger posed by these weapons and limit the proliferation of missiles, b) ensure food security for North Koreans, so as to reduce the threat of mass starvation and the great social dislocation that would entail, and c) avoid creating a climate of fear in Japan that might cause that country to develop nuclear weapons and expand its missile defense work, possibly touching off an East Asian arms race.
Beijing and Washington already have too much to worry about, so neither side benefits from instability on the Korean peninsula. While there’s little likelihood that China and the U.S. would opt to join a conflict there, both sides know that Korea is the one place where Chinese and American soldiers fought each other (just a few short years after they had battled together against Japan). Neither government wants problems in North Korea to drive their bilateral agenda, which is focused on economic recovery, fighting climate change and mitigating security threats such as North Korea.
Introducing individual Americans into the situation always complicates diplomatic work. This is partly because audiences — and thus the news media — focus much more intensely on an issue when it can be humanized through focus on a particular person and story. We saw this in the case of the Americans taken hostage in Lebanon. The Reagan administration made drastic moves, including supplying weapons to Iran, in an effort to free the hostages (and finance the Contras struggling against the Nicaraguan government). Politicians know that Americans want their government to act when and where it can. So Richardson’s trips to North Korea — one of which yielded the release of detained civilian Evan Hunziker — brought him acclaim.
North Korea’s leaders value the attention, in large measure because it bolsters their standing at home. It’s not that Kim Jong Il has to worry about slipping poll numbers. It’s that the standard message to the North Korean people is confirmed by evidence and not just repetition: that North Korea has to stand tough and tall in a dangerous world, and that it knows how to get even the mightiest power to come to the table and deal.
I’m certain that when Bill Clinton arrived in Pyongyang, the North Koreans wanted to talk about core disputes between the two countries. They knew that Clinton, as a former president, gets regular intelligence briefings, and, of course, that his wife now heads the U.S. Department of State. Of course the American government is going to deny that anything substantive was discussed, and officials are going stress that Bill Clinton is a private citizen, not a representative of the government. At the same time, all have been told that President Obama asked Clinton to make this humanitarian journey.
The U.S. will continue to push for the six-party approach, but ultimately these are talks between America and North Korea.
Some Republicans will criticize the trip, and some will suggest that secret promises were made. They’ll note that the journalists worked for a network created by Clinton’s vice president, Al Gore. Some will decry this as celebrity diplomacy and complain that it coddles a dictator. But ultimately, most people are delighted the journalists have been released, and they won’t seriously mind the North Korean government painting a picture of the giant power coming to meet their terms. Bill Clinton’s trip can only have moved things forward, by establishing a tiny amount of good will and signaling clearly that both sides hope to move forward — though the sides understand “forward” in very different ways.
Clayton Dube, associate director of the USC U.S.-China Institute, is an expert on Sino-American relations and economic and political change in China.